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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The caption contains the names of all parties to the proceeding. These parties are: 
1. The Appellant, Angel Investors, LLC, which shall be referred to herein as 
"Angel Investors" or "Plaintiff." 
2. The Appellees, Aaron Garrity, Bryan Davis, Gary Hollister, Gordon 
Morton, Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood, who shall be referred to 
collectively herein as "Defendants." 
Defendants set forth this separate list of parties to the proceeding to clear up any 
confusion that might arise from reviewing the "Complete List of All Parties to the 
Proceeding" contained in the Opening Brief of Appellant ("Plaintiffs Brief), filed by 
Angel Investors. Therein, Plaintiff indicates that the Appellee is XanGo, LLC 
("XanGo"). See Plaintiffs Brief at /. In fact, XanGo is not the Appellee. Plaintiff has 
sued XanGo in a different case entitled Angel Investors, LLC v. XanGo, LLC, Case No. 
060402848. In the matter before this Court, Plaintiff is seeking to bring suit on behalf of 
XanGo in a derivative action against the above-named Defendants. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-3-1020). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs Statement of the Issues and set forth the 
issues as follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District Court properly determine that Plaintiff does 
not appear to fairly and adequately represent similarly situated XanGo owners, as 
required under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23A(b),1 when it found Plaintiff lacked 
standing and granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)? 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court has not previously articulated 
a standard by which Utah appellate courts shall review a trial court's dismissal of a 
derivative suit on the grounds that it "appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in 
enforcing the right of the corporation or association." Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(b). Federal 
courts, which have ruled on the materially similar Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, 
have applied an abuse of discretion standard. See Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 
1
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23 A is modified from former Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.1. Rule 23.1 was amended and renumbered to Rule 23A on November 1, 
2007, after the District Court's Ruling on this matter. Like the current Rule 23A, former 
Rule 23.1 similarly prohibited the maintenance of a derivative action "if it appears that 
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the shareholders or 
members similarly situated." 
1 
1992) ("Determining whether the plaintiff [fairly and adequately represents the interests 
of similarly situated shareholders] is firmly committed to the discretion of the trial court, 
reviewable only for abuse."); Hornreich v. Plant Idus., Inc., 535 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 
1972) (applying abuse of discretion standard and stating that "[although the evidence is 
not wholly undisputed, and even though there is a possibility that some of the facts might 
not in themselves prevent a derivative suit, when considered in totality, we cannot say 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant's claim to proceed."); see 
also Read v. Read, 556 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (applying abuse of discretion 
standard). 
Preservation of Issue Below: Defendants moved to dismiss this proposed 
derivative action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), and Plaintiff opposed the motion. The District Court addressed the 
Motion in its December 21, 2007 Ruling Re: Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Paragraphs 2 
and 5-9 of Affidavits; Defendants' Motion to Strike Paragraphs 4-7 of the Declaration of 
Stephen Bean; and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit ("Ruling"). (R. 356). 
Based on the reasons set forth in the Ruling, the District Court entered, on January 25, 
2008, an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Paragraphs 2 and 5-9 of Affidavits Submitted in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Derivative Suit; Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike Paragraphs 4-7 of the 
Declaration of Stephen Bean; and Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative 
Suit (the "Order"), in which the District Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 359). 
2 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the District Court properly deny Plaintiffs request for 
further discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) when the Rule 56(f) 
request was made in response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)? 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court "review[s] the grant or denial 
of a rule 56(f) motion using an abuse of discretion standard." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 
89,^29, 16 P.3d 540. 
Preservation of Issue Below: Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 
Plaintiff responded by requesting further discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(f). That request was addressed by the District Court in its Ruling (R. 356) 
and, based on the reasons set forth therein, was denied in the District Court's Order (R. 
359). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23A, Derivative actions by shareholders 
(a) The complaint in a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members 
to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association shall be verified 
and shall allege: 
(a)(1) the right that the corporation or association could have enforced and did not; 
(a)(2) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction 
complained of or that the plaintiffs share or membership thereafter devolved to the 
plaintiff by operation of law; 
(a)(3) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on the court that it would 
not otherwise have; 
(a)(4) with particularity, the plaintiffs efforts, if any, to obtain the desired action; and 
(a)(5) the reasons for the failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. 
(b) The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly 
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. 
(c) The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, 
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or 
members in such manner as the court directs. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary Judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
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(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks to represent XanGo, LLC ("XanGo") on behalf of 
similarly situated owners of XanGo against the Defendants, who are the managing 
members and founders of XanGo. (R. 13, ^ 10, 351). Plaintiff alleges that the 
Defendants received excessive salaries, benefits, and profit distributions and committed 
various breaches of fiduciary duties (the "Derivative Claims"). (R. 10-12). 
Plaintiff originally brought allegations similar to the Derivative Claims in a suit 
against XanGo. In that suit, styled Angel Investors, LLC v. XanGo, LLC, Case No. 
060402848 (the "Direct Lawsuit"), which is still pending, XanGo seeks monetary 
damages and dissolution of XanGo, among other relief. (R. 12 If 12, 142, 235-236, 348-
349). After filing the Direct Lawsuit, Plaintiff filed this action, bringing the Derivative 
Claims against the Defendants. (R. 14). Both the Direct Lawsuit and this matter were 
assigned to Judge Howard in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County. 
(R. 12, 14). 
Defendants in this matter filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (R. 18). In the Motion, 
Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not maintain the Derivative Claims against the 
Defendants because Plaintiff did not, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23 A(b), 
appear to fairly and adequately represent the other owners of XanGo. (R. 144). In 
support of their argument, Defendants attached affidavits of every single owner of 
XanGo, other than Plaintiff, representing a total of 99% of the ownership of XanGo. (E. 
6 
352-353). Each of the affiants stated they did not support Plaintiff as a representative of 
XanGo with respect to the Derivative Claims.2 (R. 19-112). 
Plaintiff responded to this argument by asserting that it could fairly and adequately 
represent XanGo's owners but that it need not because it is a "class of one" and that there 
are no owners of XanGo who are similarly situated to Angel Investors. (R. 238, 351). In 
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff also filed a Declaration of Stephen Bean 
(R. 213), Declaration of Mary Anne Wood (R. 216), and Declaration of Richard J. 
Armstrong Pursuant to Rule 56(f) (R. 158). 
Both sides filed Motions to Strike various portions of affidavits and declarations 
filed. (R. 147,263). Plaintiff filed a motion to strike various paragraphs of the affidavits 
of the nineteen XanGo owners. (R. 147). Defendants filed a motion to strike all or 
portions of various paragraphs of the Declaration of Stephen Bean. (R. 263). 
On October 29, 2007, the District Court heard oral argument on the Motion to 
Dismiss and took that Motion and the motions to strike under advisement. (R. 342-343). 
On December 12, 2007, the District Court issued its Ruling Re: Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike Paragraphs 2 and 5-9 of Affidavits; Defendants' Motion to Strike Paragraphs 4-7 
of the Declaration of Stephen Bean; and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit. 
(R. 356). The Court subsequently entered the Order granting Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and granting and denying various portions of the motions to strike. (R. 359). 
Plaintiff asserts that the affiants' failure to deny the specific allegations in the 
Complaint regarding defendants' alleged conduct is somehow meaningful. See Plaintiffs 
Brief at 9. Such denials would have been completely irrelevant to the Rule 23 A issues 
before the District Court and, at that stage of the proceedings, would not have been 
appropriate. 
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Subsequently, Angel Investors filed this appeal. 
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review 
1. Plaintiff holds a one percent ownership interest in XanGo, LLC. (R. 353). 
(Because Plaintiff has never signed an operating agreement, the parties disagree as to 
whether Plaintiffs ownership in XanGo is limited to a profits ownership or is a member 
interest. That subject is one of the disputed issues raised in the Direct Lawsuit filed by 
Plaintiff against XanGo. To avoid confusion, Defendants will refer to all members and 
interest holders as "owners." With respect to their arguments before this Court, 
Defendants do not waive any argument they may have that Plaintiff is not a member or 
shareholder of XanGo who, in such case, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil procedure 23 A, 
would be incapable of bringing derivative claims on behalf of XanGo,) 
2. Defendants are managing members of XanGo. (R. 13, ^ f 10). 
3. Plaintiff seeks to maintain derivative claims against Defendants on behalf 
of XanGo. (R. 14). 
4. Prior to filing this derivative suit against Defendants, Plaintiff filed, and 
currently maintains, a lawsuit against XanGo in the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
seeking dissolution of XanGo and monetary damages from XanGo. (R. 238, 352-353); 
see also Plaintiffs Brief at 6-7. 
5. Defendants in this matter filed with the District Court a Motion to Dismiss 
Derivative Suit, alleging that Plaintiff does not appear to fairly and adequately represent 
the similarly situated owners of XanGo. (R. 18). 
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6. Nineteen XanGo owners (every owner other than Plaintiff) submitted 
affidavits, filed with Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Derivative Suit (R. 144), opposing Plaintiffs bid to represent their interests with respect 
to XanGo's claims. (R. 19-112). 
7. These nineteen XanGo owners, all of whom oppose Plaintiffs attempt to 
represent their interest with respect to the derivative claims, collectively own 99% of 
XanGo. (R. 352). 
8. With regard to Plaintiffs attempt to represent the interests of other XanGo 
owners in the Derivative Claims, eighteen of the nineteen affiants testified substantially 
as follows: 
Even if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made in 
the lawsuit had merit, which I do not; even if I believed the lawsuit was in 
the best interests of XanGo, which I do not; or even if I believed that the 
lawsuit should proceed, which I do not, in my capacity as a Member of 
XanGo I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or properly represents 
the interests of XanGo or the Members of XanGo. As a Member of 
XanGo, I am opposed to a company comprised of individuals who have 
declined to sign the Amended Operating Agreement (which all of the 
Members of XanGo have agreed to as embodying the proper way to govern 
this company), [and] who have asserted direct claims against XanGo in 
another case (which is pending before this Court), [clause stricken], 
purporting to act in the best interests of XanGo and having control of a 
lawsuit purporting to seek the best interests of XanGo and its Members. 
(R. 20, 24-25, 29-30, 34-35, 39-40, 44-45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 69-70, 74-75, 85, 89-90, 95, 99-
100,104-105, 109-110). 
9. The only XanGo owner whose testimony was substantively different was 
that of Genesis Resource Group, LLC, who has, like Plaintiff, declined to sign XanGo's 
9 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (R. 350). Genesis Resource Group, LLC's 
affidavit submitted to the District Court provided as follows: 
I have not had enough opportunity to determine whether any of 
Angel's claims have merit. However, if I believed that the allegations 
Angel Investors has made in the lawsuit had merit; if I believed the lawsuit 
was in the best interests of XanGo; or if I believed that a similar lawsuit 
should proceed, I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or completely 
represents the interests of XanGo or the Members and interest holders of 
XanGo. Additionally, Genesis is not convinced that it is good to have a 
company comprised of individuals who have asserted direct claims against 
XanGo in another case (which is pending before this Court), [clause 
stricken] bringing this type of action on behalf of XanGo. 
(R. 80, H 8). 
10. Plaintiff has not signed a XanGo Operating Agreement. (R. 141, 233-235, 
353). 
11. According to Plaintiff, every non-defendant XanGo owner would benefit if 
the Derivative Claims Plaintiff sought to bring were proven. Plaintiff would not receive a 
separate or distinct benefit by prevailing in the derivative action. (R. 227, 350, 352). 
12. The District Court struck paragraphs four through seven of the Declaration 
of Stephen Bean, which Plaintiff filed in support of its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit. (R. 353-354).3 
3
 In its brief, Plaintiff cites to these stricken paragraphs as support for argument that 
XanGo members were coerced or bribed, or subject to coercion or bribery, in exchange 
for their affidavit testimony, despite the fact that Plaintiff has not appealed the District 
Court's ruling on the motions to strike. It is inappropriate to cite such inadmissible and 
stricken evidence. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court needs to determine whether a single owner, with a one percent 
ownership interest in a company, can force the company into litigation by bringing claims 
on behalf of that company when the proposed derivative plaintiff is simultaneously 
adverse to the company in a separate action and is actively seeking its dissolution, and 
when every other owner of the company, collectively owning 99% of the company, 
opposes the litigation and the proposed derivative plaintiffs representation of their 
interests in the derivative claims. 
This Court should affirm the District Court's order dismissing the Verified 
Complaint and denying Plaintiffs request for fiirther discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(f). The Court should find that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that (1) Plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent other 
XanGo owners, (2) Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss should not be converted 
to a motion for summary judgment, and (3) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) request for further 
discovery should not be granted. 
First, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Plaintiff 
cannot maintain this derivative suit because it "appears that the plaintiff does not fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated 
in enforcing the right of the corporation or association." Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(b). In 
making this determination, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it found 
that Plaintiff would not adequately represent other XanGo owners and that Plaintiff could 
not proceed as a "class of one," representing only its own interests. 
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This Court has not established what factors a court should consider when 
determining whether other owners are similarly situated to a derivative plaintiff. Other 
jurisdictions addressing this subject hold that relevancy, both to the claims and the 
beneficiaries of the claims, is the single most important factor to be considered. The 
District Court properly determined, and Plaintiff agrees, that every non-Defendant 
XanGo owner stands to benefit if the Derivative Claims in this matter were proved. 
Because all non-defendant XanGo owners have a financial stake in the derivative claims, 
every non-defendant XanGo owner is similarly situated to Plaintiff with respect to the 
Derivative Claims. Plaintiff asks this Court to simply ignore all XanGo owners other than 
itself merely because they are related to Defendants or their spouses, are XanGo 
employees, or because Plaintiff alleges that they benefit economically from being in the 
good graces of the Defendants. Even if these assertions all were relevant, Plaintiff has 
not supported these assertions with anything other than conclusory statements and asks 
this Court to assume that these relationships with Defendants have caused all other 
owners of XanGo to act against the best interests of the company. 
Each non-Defendant XanGo owner submitted an affidavit asserting that the 
Derivative Claims, and Plaintiffs attempted enforcement of those claims on behalf of 
XanGo, are not in the company's best interests. This Court is not in a position to second-
guess that testimony and should not accept Plaintiffs invitation to do so. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs claim that there are no other XanGo owners similarly situated to itself for 
purposes of a Rule 23A(b) analysis is clearly wrong, as all non-Defendant XanGo owners 
would benefit if the Derivative Claims were successfully proved. 
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Having correctly determined that there are other XanGo owners who are similarly 
situated to Plaintiff, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiff 
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of those XanGo owners. The 
District Court made its determination based on the totality of the circumstances, utilizing 
factors set forth by multiple federal courts. The District Court found that a conflict of 
interest exists between Plaintiff and XanGo's owners because Plaintiff is currently 
pursuing a lawsuit against XanGo in which it actively seeks the dissolution of XanGo and 
seeks money damages from XanGo, both of which would harm XanGo's other owners. 
The District Court also found that Plaintiffs interests conflict with the interests of the 
similarly situated XanGo owners based on the fact that every single XanGo owner other 
than Plaintiff, representing 99% of the ownership of XanGo, testified that they do not 
support Plaintiff as a representative of XanGo's owners with respect to the claims. 
Other factors which demonstrate Plaintiffs inability to fairly and adequately 
represent XanGo's owners include the fact that Plaintiff has not signed an operating 
agreement with XanGo, and the amount of damages which would inure to Plaintiff 
should it prove the Derivative Claims is negligible, calling into question Plaintiffs 
motives for bringing the derivative claims. Based on these factors, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Verified Complaint based on Plaintiffs inability 
to fairly and adequately represent similarly situated XanGo owners. 
Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Rule 
56(f) request for further discovery. As this Court has held, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(f) does not apply to motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), such as the motion 
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brought by Defendants. Rule 56(f) applies to motions for summary judgment only. 
Moreover, unlike motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), motions to 
dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) are not subject to conversion to motions for 
summary judgment when affidavits or other discovery-type materials are attached. 
Despite this Court's prior rulings on the subject, Plaintiff filed a declaration 
pursuant to Rule 56(f) and argued to the District Court that Defendants' motion should be 
converted to a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff now claims that the District 
Court abused its discretion in treating its request for further discovery as a request made 
pursuant to Rule 56(f), and that the District Court should have simply treated the motion 
as a general request for further discovery. Plaintiff is not entitled to relief it failed to 
request before the District Court. Moreover, the discovery that Plaintiff sought was not 
related to the issue of Plaintiffs ability to fairly and adequately represent similarly 
situated XanGo owners. The facts relevant to the Court's Rule 23A analysis were 
affirmatively established by sworn affidavit testimony and were undisputed. Additional 
discovery would not have changed those facts. This Court should find that the District 
Court did not err in refiising Plaintiffs request for further relief. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS' RULE 
12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN IT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF 
DOES NOT APPEAR TO FAIRLY AND ADEQUATELY REPRESENT 
SIMILARLY SITUATED SHAREHOLDERS PURSUANT TO RULE 23A 
Plaintiff cannot maintain a suit on behalf of XanGo because, as the trial court 
correctly ruled, it did not appear to fairly and adequately represent similarly situated 
owners of XanGo. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23 A(b) states that a "derivative action 
may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the 
right of the corporation or association." "In the context of derivative as well as class 
actions, the requirement of fair and adequate representation is of crucial importance, for 
in both contexts, the rights and interests of absent persons may be conclusively 
determined." Mayer v. Dev. Corp. of America, 396 F. Supp. 917, 930 (D. Del. 1975). 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the importance oi the representative 
plaintiff in a derivative action, stating that 
. . . a stockholder who brings suit on a cause of action derived from the 
corporation assumes a position . . . of fiduciary character. He sues, not for 
himself alone, but as a representative of a class comprising all who are 
similarly situated. The interests of all in the redress of the wrongs are taken 
into his hands, dependent upon his diligence, wisdom, and integrity. And 
while the stockholders have chosen the corporate director or manager, they 
have no such election as to a plaintiff who steps forward to represent them. 
He is a self-chosen representative and a volunteer champion. 
Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549-550 (1949). 
As set forth below, Utah courts have had little opportunity to establish either the 
factors a court should consider when determining whether a derivative plaintiff "fairly 
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and adequately" represents similarly situated owners or the method by which courts 
should apply any such factors. Plaintiff argues that this Court need not establish these 
factors or the method of their application, claiming, erroneously, that Rule 23 A does not 
apply to this case because Plaintiff is a "class of one" and need not represent the interests 
of anyone other than itself. To prevail in this argument, Plaintiff must demonstrate 
(which it did not and cannot do) that the District Court abused its discretion in finding 
that other owners are similarly situated to Plaintiff because other owners would share in 
the economic benefit if the Derivative Claims are proved true. (R. 350). The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that A) there are XanGo owners 
similarly situated to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff must represent the interests of those 
owners, and B) Plaintiff does not appear to fairly and adequately represent those similarly 
situated XanGo owners as required by Rule 23 A(b). 
A, The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Finding that XanGo 
Owners are Similarly Situated to Plaintiff in this Derivative Action and 
Plaintiff Must Represent the Interests of those Owners. 
The District Court properly found that there are XanGo owners similarly situated 
to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff cannot proceed as a "class of one." The starting point for 
determining whether the District Court abused its discretion is establishing what factors a 
district court should consider when determining whether there are any owners similarly 
situated to a derivative plaintiff. This requires a determination of what Rule 23 A means 
when it states that a derivative plaintiff must "fairly and adequately represent the interests 
of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation 
or association." Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(b) (emphasis added). The Rule's language 
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suggests that the concept of "similarly situated" is tied to enforcement of the company's 
rights with respect to the claims at issue in the derivative suit. While "Rule 23.1 does not 
enumerate the factors which a court is to consider in determining similarity of situation; 
relevance obviously places some limits on the items to be considered . . . ." Jordon v. 
Bowman Apple Prods. Co., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 409, 413 (W.D. Va. 1990). Based on the 
language of Rule 23A, the only relevant consideration in this matter is which non-
defendant XanGo owners would benefit financially if the allegations in this derivative 
action were proved, and the answer to that question, clearly, is all of them. All non-
defendant XanGo owners stand to gain (or lose) with respect to the Derivative Claim 
Plaintiffs sought to pursue in proportion to their ownership of XanGo and, therefore, the 
derivative plaintiff must represent their interests as the "similarly situated" owners 
contemplated by Rule 23A. 
Plaintiff disagrees, apparently believing that it need not represent anyone's 
interests with respect to XanGo's claims but its own. This assertion is made despite the 
fact that, as the District Court noted, Plaintiff claimed that "this suit is in the best interest 
of all non-defendant members of XanGo." (R. 352). Plaintiff also makes this assertion 
despite the fact that, as the Fifth Circuit and other courts have noted "[o]nly in the rarest 
instances may there be a shareholder derivative action with a class of one." Smith v. 
Ayres, 911 F.3d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1992). 
Plaintiff contends that the District Court "narrowed down [the] potential class of 
injured minority shareholders by eliminating from its consideration the six defendants, 
the seven XanGo employees, and the two family members of defendants who submitted 
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affidavits." Plaintiffs Brief at 27. This assertion mischaracterizes the District Court's 
ruling. What the District Court actually held was that even if the named defendants, their 
family members, and XanGo employees were not similarly situated to Plaintiff, at least 
four other XanGo owners were. (R. 346). Contrary to Plaintiffs representation, the 
Court's analysis did not "eliminate" any particular XanGo owner as being similarly 
situated to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff asserts that the proper owner class is "often based on the characteristics 
of the shareholders' ownership interests and relationship with the defendants." Plaintiffs 
Brief at 28. Plaintiff cites no authority for this assertion. Plaintiff cites Jordon v. 
Bowman Apple Prods. Co. as an example of a case in which a court set a shareholder 
class based on voting rights. That case is inapposite. In Jordon, the derivative plaintiffs 
claims were against all other shareholders of the company regarding actions taken with 
respect to a voting-rights agreement and, as such, the derivative plaintiff was the only 
party who would benefit from the claims. 728 F. Supp. at 413. Plaintiffs reliance on 
Larson v. Dumke is similarly misplaced. In Larson, the Ninth Circuit permitted a 
shareholder to bring derivative claims as a "class of one" when all of "the other 
shareholders were opposed to Larson's [derivative] suit because Larson's success would 
ultimately injure them financially whether or not it benefitted the corporation." Smith, 
977 F.3d at 949. The case before this Court is different than the cases before the Larson 
arid Jordon courts. Unlike in those cases, Plaintiff here seeks to proceed as a class of one 
despite the fact that, as Plaintiff itself acknowledges, the Derivative Claims would, if 
proven, benefit all non-defendant shareholders. 
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This matter is similar to that facing the Fifth Circuit in Smith, in Smith, the Fifth 
Circuit upheld a trial court's dismissal of a derivative suit because the proposed 
derivative plaintiff held a small interest in the company and the owners of "virtually 
100% of [the company], simply fundamentally disagree with [the proposed derivative 
plaintiff] on what is good for the corporation." Id. at 949. Despite the prevailing case 
law, Plaintiff asserts that this Court, when determining the class of owners for this 
derivative suit, should ignore not only the named defendants, but also every other XanGo 
owner despite their clear economic interest in the Derivative Claims. Plaintiff attempts to 
justify its position by asserting that all other XanGo owners are somehow either related to 
the defendants, are XanGo employees, are XanGo members MIIU have signed the 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement, or are XanGo owners who do not support 
Plaintiffs efforts to maintain the Derivative Claims. Id. at 28-31. 
Plaintiffs proposed class is not based on criteria relevant to the claims or to 
economic reality but is, rather, based on criteria relevant only to Plaintiff and it is 
transparently designed in an attempt to create a "class of one." Plaintiffs refusal to sign 
the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement is entirely irrelevant to the substance of 
the Derivative Claims.4 The Complaint in this derivative action does not mention the 
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement or the legal issues between XanGo and 
4
 In fact, the only arguable relevance Appellant's refusal to sign XanGo's Amended and 
Restated Operating Agreement has to this matter weighs against Plaintiffs attempt to be 
XanGo's class representative. Moreover, as discussed in Section LB.3, infra, Plaintiffs 
refusal to sign a XanGo operating agreement also means that Plaintiff is not a member of 
XanGo, and thus is not even eligible in the first instance to bring derivative claims on 
behalf on XanGo's behalf. 
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Plaintiff regarding Plaintiffs refusal to sign that Agreement. (R. 9-14). When Plaintiff 
states that "Angel alleges, among other things, that the Defendants attempted to use the 
Amended Operating Agreement to oppress Angel and coax it into submission with the 
Defendants' demands," Plaintiffs Brief at 31, it confuses the Direct Lawsuit, which is 
pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court, with this derivative suit before this Court. 
This confusion with respect to the two cases evidences the fact that Plaintiff merely seeks 
to advance its own agenda by bringing these Derivative Claims, without regard to the 
interests of XanGo's other owners. In any event, Plaintiffs refusal to sign the Amended 
and Restated Operating has no bearing on proper composition of an owner class. 
Similarly, Plaintiff contends that this Court should ignore the remaining XanGo 
owners, either because they are XanGo employees, relatives of Defendants, or would 
otherwise economically benefit from supporting Defendants. In the first instance, this 
contention is simply wrong. Genesis Resources, LLC not only did not sign the Amended 
and Restated Operating Agreement, it also was not a XanGo employee or a relative of 
any Defendant, and it would not otherwise economically benefit from supporting 
Defendants. (R. 223, 350).5 
5
 Appellant argues on page 30 of its brief that Genesis Group is not similarly situated to 
Angel "because it has indicated its desire, along with the other minority owners, to allow 
the misfeasance in the company to continue in perpetuity." This assertion is wholly 
inappropriate, without any record support, and based solely on the circular reasoning that 
Genesis Group should be disregarded simply because it does not agree with Plaintiff. 
Appellant then claims Genesis Group was "threatened by XanGo." Id. As support for 
this statement, Appellant cites "R.211-12, ffi[6-7." This citation is to paragraphs 6 and 7 
of the Declaration of Stephen Bean. Appellant thereafter cites paragraph 6 of Bean's 
Declaration on two more occasions. See Appellants Brief at 30, 31. The District Court 
struck paragraphs 6 and 7 (among others) of Bean's Declaration (R. 353), and Appellant 
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In addition, Plaintiffs contention is self-serving and ignores the claims in this case 
and who might benefit from them. Plaintiff asserts that solely because certain XanGo 
owners were XanGo employees or relatives of Defendants and their voices should not be 
heard with respect to support for or opposition to Plaintiffs maintenance of the 
Derivative Claims. This assertion ignores the fact that, if the Derivative Claims are 
proved, those owner/employees and owner/relatives might economically benefit in 
proportion to their ownership in XanGo, just as Plaintiff would Plaintiff also claims, 
without any evidentiary support, that the other non-employee, non-relative XanGo 
owners will benefit from maintaining a good relationship with Defendants. Plaintiffs 
arguments are devoid of record support and insufficient to show an abuse of discretion by 
the District Court. 
Plaintiffs proposed criteria for determining a class bears no relevance whatsoever 
to the class of XanGo owners that would be affected if the allegations against Defendants 
in this Derivative Lawsuit were proved. A class is determined based on the relevancy of 
the claims and how those claims impact the members of the class, not a set of factors 
derived by a putative plaintiff that would permit that particular plaintiff to proceed as a 
class representative. Were the rule otherwise, every party desiring to represent a legal 
entity as a derivative plaintiff could distinguish itself into a "class of one" by articulating 
factors unique to that party. 
has not challenged that ruling on appeal. Appellant's citation as record support to 
paragraphs of a declaration that were stricken is not improper. 
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Tellingly, the courts that permit a shareholder to maintain a derivative action as a 
"class of one" do so specifically because the outcome of the derivative suit will only 
affect that particular shareholder. See Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., 957 S.W.2d 
536, 540 (Tenn. 1997) (permitting "class of one" when only derivative plaintiff would 
benefit from suit); see also J or don, 728 F. Supp. at 412-13; Halsted Video, Inc. v. 
Guttillo, 115 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. 111. 1987); Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 796 S.W.2d 160 
(Tex. 1990); demons v. Wallace, 592 P.2d 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). In each of these 
cases, the "class of one" proceeded because the plaintiff was the only shareholder that 
would benefit by proving the derivative claims. These situations arise when the 
derivative plaintiff is the only non-defendant shareholder or is the only non-defendant 
shareholder that stands to benefit economically through the remedy sought in the 
derivative action. In such cases the corporation would have no remedy if the derivative 
plaintiff could not bring the suit. See Halsted Video, 115 F.R.D. at 180. 
Unlike the plaintiff in these cases, Plaintiff here is not the only non-defendant 
XanGo owner and is not the only party that stands to benefit from this case and, 
therefore, there is no basis to allow Plaintiff to proceed as a "class of one". Furthermore, 
even if Plaintiff cannot bring this derivative suit, some other XanGo owner could pursue 
these claims if they are truly in the best interest of XanGo. The "similarly situated 
members" in this case are XanGo's non-defendant owners, and those owners' unanimous 
opposition to Plaintiff as their class representative, as well as Plaintiffs conflicts of 
interest, prevents Plaintiff from fairly and adequately representing their interests. 
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Plaintiff has asked this Court to define an owner class in a way that would permit 
any shareholder in any case to bring derivative claims without being required to represent 
the interests of any other owners. Plaintiff invites this Court to find that unanimous 
opposition from multiple company owners still permits a derivative plaintiff owning a 
one percent interest in the company, who has no remedy separate or distinct from that of 
other non-defendant owners, to represent the company's claims without regard to the 
interests of all other owners. This despite the fact that, as set forth below, lack of owner 
support for a proposed derivative plaintiff is an important factor to be considered when 
determining whether a proposed plaintiff may fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of similarly situated owners. This Court should reject Plaintiffs invitation and 
ensure that a company's claims are not left in the hands of a minority owner who will not 
make shareholder class determinations on a basis that is unrelated to the derivative 
plaintiffs duty and responsibility to "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or 
association." Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(b). 
B The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Finding that 
Plaintiff Does Not Appear to Fairly and Adequately Represent 
Similarly Situated XanGo Members. 
Utah courts have had little opportunity to determine either which factors should be 
considered when determining whether a derivative plaintiff "fairly and adequately" 
represents a company's owners or the i net hod by which courts should apply any such 
factors. There are, however, several federal court rulings interpreting Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23.1 which, like Utah Rule 23A(b), prohibits representation by a 
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derivative plaintiff who does not "appear to fairly and adequately represent" similarly 
situated owners of a corporation. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy Ltd., 725 F.2d 204 
(3d Cir. 1983); Rothenberg v. Security Mgmt. Co., 667 F.2d 958 (11th Cir. 1982); Davis 
v. Corned, Inc., 619 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1980). The requirement that derivative 
representation be "fair" and "adequate" has led these federal courts to "examine any 
indications that there are extrinsic factors which render it likely that the representative 
may disregard the interests of the class members." Davis, 619 F.2d at 593 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "Whether a particular plaintiff will fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of other similarly situated shareholders as required by Rule 23.1 
turns upon the total facts and circumstances of each case." Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 961. 
Because Rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 23.1 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are "substantively identical," Utah Courts may "freely refer to 
authorities which have interpreted the federal rule." LeVanger v. Highland Estates 
Properties Owners Assoc, Inc., 80 P.3d 569, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Among the federal courts addressing the issue, the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Davis v. Corned, and for the Eleventh Circuit, in 
Rothenberg v. Security Mgmt. Co., present the most complete articulation of the factors to 
be considered when determining whether a proposed derivative plaintiff appears to 
"fairly and adequately represent" similarly situated owners. The Sixth Circuit, in Davis, 
states that "[a]mong the elements which the courts have evaluated in considering whether 
the derivative plaintiff meets Rule 23.1's representation requirements are: 
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economic antagonisms between representative and class; the remedy sought 
by plaintiff in the derivative action; indications that the named plaintiff was 
not the driving force behind the litigation; plaintiffs unfamiliarity with the 
litigation; other litigation pending between the plaintiff and the defendants; 
the relative magnitude of plaintiffs personal interests as compared to his 
interest in the derivative action itself; plaintiffs vindictiveness toward the 
defendants; and, finally, the degree of support plaintiff was receiving from 
the shareholders he purported to represent. 
Davis, 619 F.2d at 594. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Rothenberg states that 
"[s]ome of the factors to be considered by courts include: 
(1) indications that the plaintiff is not the true party in interest, (2) the 
plaintiffs unfamiliarity with the litigation and unwillingness to learn about 
the suit, (3) the degree of control exercised by the attorneys over the 
litigation, (4) the degree of support received by the plaintiff from other 
shareholders, and (5) the lack of any personal commitment to the action on 
the part of the representative plaintiff. 
Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 961 (citations omitted). 
The application of such factors ensures that "the representative party in a class 
action [is] free of any interest which holds the potential of influencing his conduct of the 
litigation in ,i manner inconsistent with the interests of the class." DuPont v. Wyly, 61 
F.R.D. 615, 624 (D. Del. 1973). Courts have articulated these and other factors relevant 
to fair and adequate representation in terms of "outside entanglements", G.A. Enters., Inc. 
v. Leisure Living Commun., Inc., M7 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1975) and "conflicts of 
interest," Ryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 133, 135-136 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The 
presence of one or more of such elements may result in derivative plaintiff being unable 
to "fairly ami tdequately" represent similarly situated owners of a company such as 
XanGo. 
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The District Court made findings based on the factors set forth above and, as a 
result of these findings and the totality of the circumstances., properly determined that 
Plaintiff does not appear to fairly and adequately represent similarly situated owners of 
XanGo. The District Court properly granted Defendants' motion to dismiss based on its 
finding that 1) Plaintiff is pursuing the Direct Lawsuit against XanGo in which it seeks 
dissolution of XanGo and monetary damages from XanGo, creating a conflict of interest 
with Plaintiffs attempted representation of XanGo's owners on XanGo's derivative 
claims; 2) all of XanGo's owners (who own 99% of the company) other than Plaintiff 
(who owns 1% of the company) oppose Plaintiffs attempt to represent other owners with 
respect to XanGo's derivative claims; and 3) other "outside entanglements" and 
"conflicts of interest" exist, demonstrating that Plaintiff does not appear to fairly and 
adequately represent similarly situated XanGo owners. These findings are discussed 
below. 
1. Plaintiffs Direct Lawsuit Against XanGo Requesting, Among Other 
Relief, Damages from and Dissolution of XanGo, Creates an Actual 
Conflict of Interest. 
As noted in Davis and Rothenberg, courts determining whether a proposed 
derivative plaintiff, such as Plaintiff, appears to fairly and adequately represent similarly 
situated owners of a company should consider the conflict of interest created when, at the 
same time, the derivative plaintiff maintains a lawsuit directly against the company 
whose claims it seeks to pursue in the derivative suit. The District Court determined that 
no per se rule bars Plaintiff from simultaneously maintaining direct claims against 
XanGo and derivative claims on behalf of XanGo. This determination was based in large 
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part on cases such as In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 455 F.Supp. 
999, 1014 (D.C. III. 1978), cited by Plaintiff in its Opening Brief before this Court, in 
Transocean the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois stated that 
shareholders have a "right to bring direct and derivative actions simultaneously" but that 
doing so always creates a "theoretical conflict of interest." Id. at 1014. 
An actual conflict of interest is created when the relief sought in the direct action 
against the company is "incompatible" with the relief sought in the derivative action on 
the company's behalf. See Ryan, 765 F. Supp. at 135-137. In Ryan, the Southern District 
of New York dismissed a derivative suit based on the "incompatibility of the relief sought 
by plaintiff in his dual role" as a derivative plaintiff and in his direct suit against the 
corporation.6 Id. at 135-136. This "incompatibility" was inherent in the relief requested 
by the plaintiff: additional payments for the sale of a portion of the company in the 
derivative suit, and, in the direct suit, damages, including punitive damages, from the 
corporation and other defendants, and the imposition of a constructive trust on the funds 
received for the sale of the portion of the company. Id. at 136. The Ryan court dismissed 
the derivative suit, finding that the plaintiff was "subject to a conflict of interest in 
pursuing both direct and derivative claims in this action, which renders him unable 'fairly 
and adequately [to] represent the interests of the shareholders' . . . . " Id. at 136-137. 
As in Ryan, there is an actual conflict of interest in the relief sought by Plaintiff in 
the DiriTl Lawsuit and in representing owners of XanGo in this derivative matter. In the 
6
 The derivative plaintiff in Ryan sought to represent a class of plaintiffs in a direct suit 
against the company, but no class had been certified. See Ryan, 765 F. Supp. at 134-135. 
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Direct Lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks dissolution of XanGo as a company, as well as money 
damages. There is an inherent conflict of interest in Plaintiff purporting to represent 
XanGo while simultaneously maintaining a suit seeking to effect the "corporate death" of 
XanGo through dissolution. Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(analogizing dissolution to "corporate death"). 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in a case very similar to this case, acknowledged 
such a conflict and dismissed a derivative suit in which the derivative plaintiff had moved 
to dissolve the corporation. See Read v. Read, 556 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). In 
Read, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's dismissal of a derivative suit 
based on its finding "that the motions advanced by the plaintiff for dissolution and 
appointment of a receiver eliminated the prospect of the plaintiff being able to 'fairly and 
adequately represent the corporate interest.'" Id. at 771. The Read court adopted the trial 
court's reasoning that "the dissolution and receivership motions . . . were an anathema to 
the best interests of the corporation." Id, Plaintiffs attempts to dissolve XanGo create 
an obvious and actual conflict of interest with its attempts to simultaneously bring claims 
on XanGo's behalf. 
A conflict of interest also arises from Plaintiffs request for damages in the Direct 
Lawsuit. Any damages that Plaintiff receives in the Direct Lawsuit would take money 
out of the corporation and away from the owners Plaintiff seeks to represent in the 
derivative suit. Because Plaintiff does not and cannot fairly and adequately represent all 
owners of XanGo in this derivative action, and because its goals in the Direct Lawsuit are 
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fundamentally in conflict with the interests of XanGo's other owners, the District Court 
properly ruled that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue on behalf of XanGo. 
Plaintiff, in its Opening Brief, does not cite to any cases in which a party seeking 
dissolution of and damages from a corporation has been found to "fairly and adequately" 
represent similarly situated owners of that corporation in a derivative suit. Plaintiff 
relies, instead, on misguided inference, as evidenced by its reliance on three inapposite 
cases in which the derivative plaintiffs representation of similarly situated owners was 
not at issue. These three cases, Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., 957 S.W.2d 536 
(Tenn. 1997), Neusteter v. District Court, 675 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1984), and GFLP, Ltd v. CL 
Mgmt. Ltd, 2007 UT App. 131, 163 P.3d 636, do not support Plaintiffs claim that it 
fairly and adequately represents similarly situated owners of XanGo despite its ongoing 
attempts to dissolve XanGo and recover money damages from XanGo. 
Among the three cases cited by Plaintiff, in only one, Hall, was the derivative 
plaintiffs standing at issue. In Hall, the Tennessee Supreme Court permitted a 
shareholder to bring derivative claims while maintaining a direct claim against the 
company for dissolution because the plaintiff shareholder was lln on! * sktidtoliln w In > 
would benefit from the derivative claims. See Hall 957 S.W.2d at 540. The Hall court 
acknowledged that "[maintaining a derivative action on behalf of a corporation while at 
the same time asserting an individual claim against the rmpoiation iiia\ < in^lilule a 
conflict of interest; and, if there is a conflict of interest, the shareholder is disqualified 
from maintaining a derivative action . . . ." Id. The court found no conflict of interest, 
however, because the derivative plaintiff was "not attempting to represent (lie interests of 
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any other shareholders. He [was] the only similarly situated shareholder." Id. Because 
there were no similarly situated shareholders, there was no one for the Hall plaintiff to 
"fairly and adequately" represent other than himself. In order for Hall to have any 
application to the matter before this Court, therefore, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
District Court erred when it ruled that Plaintiff could not proceed as a "class of one." For 
the reasons set forth in Section LA, supra, the District Court properly ruled that Plaintiff 
cannot proceed as a "class of one" because Plaintiffs claims v/ould benefit all owners of 
XanGo, not just Plaintiff. Hall does not support Plaintiffs claim that it "fairly and 
adequately" represents similarly situated owners of XanGo. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Neusteter, which dealt with the application of Colorado's 
statutory accountant-client privilege, see Neusteter, 675 P.2d at 2-3, is similarly flawed. 
In that case, the petitioners, who were defendants in a derivative action brought by the 
only non-defendant shareholders of two closely held family corporations, sought to have 
the Colorado Supreme Court reverse the district court's order compelling testimony and 
the production of documents that petitioners claimed fell within the accountant-client 
privilege. Id. at 3. The Neusteter court was not asked to determine whether the 
derivative plaintiffs, who also brought direct claims against the companies for dissolution 
and other relief, could "fairly and adequately" represent similarly situated shareholders. 
In fact, there were no shareholders similarly situated to the derivative plaintiff because all 
remaining shareholders were defendants in the derivative action. Id. The Colorado 
Supreme Court's only task was to determine whether the derivative claims were brought 
in good faith, as that court had previously ruled that the statutory accountant-client 
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privilege did not apply to derivative suit brought in good faith. Id. Neusteter does not 
support Plaintiffs contention that the District Court here erred in finding that Plaintiff 
does not "fairly and adequately represent" similarly situated owners. 
Plaintiffs reliance on GLFP, is also misplaced In GFLP, as Plaintiff 
acknowledges its Opening Brief, the Utah Court of Appeals did not rule on whether the 
plaintiff "fairly and adequately" represented other shareholders' interests in the derivative 
action when it also brought a direct action against the corporation seeking dissolution. 
See Plaintiffs Brief at 24. In GFLP the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment and was concerned only with the question of whether the 
trial court correctly labeled certain claims as direct or derivative. See GFLP, 2007 UT 
App. 131, TJ 6, 163 P.3d 636. In GFLP, a minority shareholder brought breach of 
fiduciary duty and other claims belonging to the corporation as direct claims against the 
corporation and the trial court granted the corporations motion for summary judgment, 
determining that the claims belonged not to the individual shareholder, but to the 
corporation itself. Id. Plaintiff argues that, because the GFLP court did not rule on the 
plaintiffs ability to "fairly and adequately" represent similarly situated shareholders, an 
issue which was not before the trial court or the Court of Appeals, that the court "clearly 
indicated" that direct and derivative claims can "co-exist". Plaintiffs Brief at 24. It 
cannot be argued that Utah courts condone corporate representation bv a plaintiff with 
clear conflicts ol interest, such as Plaintiff, simply because the GFLP court did not 
submit an advisory opinion condemning the practice. It may well be that the plaintiff in 
GFLP could not have "fairly and adequately" represented similarly situated shareholders, 
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which might explain why it brought derivative claims directly against the corporation. 
That issue was not before the Court of Appeals, however, and the court's silence on that 
issue does not assist this Court in determining whether or not the District Court erred 
when it found that Plaintiff does not "fairly and adequately" represent similarly situated 
owners of XanGo. 
Finally, Plaintiff relies on its unsupported assertion that its direct claims for 
dissolution and damages are "compatible" with the derivative claims because, according 
to Plaintiff, "dissolution, if successful, would force a reorganization of the enterprise that 
would result in a fairer return for all members." Plaintiffs Brief at 25. Plaintiff offered 
no explanation as to how dissolution would (or even could) force a reorganization of 
XanGo or how "dissolution" and "reorganization" are even compatible. Further, Plaintiff 
offered no evidence before the District Court that dissolution would be helpful or 
beneficial to XanGo's owners and, in fact, it plainly would not. It is beyond rational 
dispute that XanGo is far more profitable and valuable to its owners as a going concern 
than it would be as a dissolved entity with nothing left but inventory to disburse to the 
owners. If dissolution would be beneficial to XanGo, one would expect other XanGo 
owners to join Plaintiffs efforts in the dissolution action and/or support Plaintiffs efforts 
in the derivative action. See Read, 556 N.W.2d at 772. Instead, every XanGo owner 
other than Plaintiff actively opposes Plaintiffs attempted representation of XanGo's 
interests in a derivative suit. 
The District Court did not err in determining that Plaintiff does not appear to 
"fairly and adequately" represent similarly situated XanGo owners. It properly found 
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that Plaintiffs direct claims against XanGo for dissolution and damages creates an actual 
conflict of interest with its purported representation of similarly situated XanGo owners 
with respect to XanGo's derivative claims. The District Court properly applied these 
factors as set forth in Davis and Rothenberg, and its decision was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
2. All XanGo Owners Except Plaintiff Oppose Plaintiffs Attempt to 
Represent XanGo in the Derivative Action. 
All XanGo owners except Plaintiff, who owns a one percent interest in XanGo, 
have actively opposed Plaintiffs attempt to represent the interests of XanGo's owners 
with respect to the derivative claims. Davis, Rothenberg, and other federal court rulings 
have stated that a key factor to be considered in determining whether a derivative plaintiff 
fairly and adequately represents the company is "the degree of support received by the 
plaintiff from other shareholders . . . ." Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 961. See also Davis, 
619 F.2d at 594; Larson v. Durnke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir.) ("The degree of 
support a putative plaintiff receives from other shareholders . . . is a factor that should be 
considered in determining adequacy of representation."). In the case before this Court, 
Plaintiff has received no support from other owners and, in fact, every other owner 
actively opposes Plaintiffs attempt to maintain XanGo's claims. 
In evaluating this factor, the Davis court cited Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co,, 449 
F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1971), in which the Sixth Circuit upheld a trial court's finding that the 
derivative plaintiff did not "fairly and adequately" represent similarly situated 
shareholders and noted that "[s]eventy-nine of the Company's 84 shareholders, who 
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together owned approximately 96% of the outstanding stock, indicated that they did not 
wish to be represented by Nolen in the class action and that they did not believe Nolen 
would adequately and fairly represent their interests in the derivative action." Nolen, 449 
F.2d at 507 (affirming on other grounds). Similarly, in Guttman v. Braemer, 51 F.R.D. 
537 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the Southern District of New York found influential the fact that 
"no members of the other proposed subclasses have indicated an interest in the suit by 
instituting independent suits of their own, which frequently happens where the claims are 
believed to be meritorious and in the interests of the class." Id. at 539. The Guttman 
court also noted that there had been no "indication that members of these other proposed 
subclasses desire to be represented by plaintiff." Id. See also Kuzmickey v. Dunmore 
Corp., 420 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dismissing derivative suit when individual 
defendants who jointly owned 70% of the corporation asserted "that plaintiffs interests 
are obviously antagonistic to theirs and . . . submitted affidavits of the remaining six 
shareholders each of whom contends that the plaintiff does not represent their interest 
and, that the suit is not brought in the best interest of the corporation."). 
In the case before this Court, 19 of XanGo's 20 owners, who together own 99% of 
XanGo, have indicated that they do not wish to be represented by Plaintiff with respect to 
the derivative claims. Put another way, 100% of XanGo's owners other than Plaintiff 
submitted testimony to the District Court rejecting Plaintiffs bid to represent them with 
respect to the derivative claims. Based on XanGo's owners' unanimous rejection of 
Plaintiff as class representative, the District Court properly determined that Plaintiff does 
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not appear to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the similarly situated owners 
of XanGo. 
Plaintiff makes several arguments in its attempt to deflect the fact that every 
XanGo owner other than itself testified in an affidavit submitted to the District Court that 
Plaintiff does not represent their interests with respect to the derivative claims. Plaintiff 
argues that the District Court erred in finding that XanGo owners were similarly situated 
to Plaintiff and that the District Court erred by denying its Rule 56(f) request to conduct 
further discovery. As set forth, respectively, in Sections LA, supra, and III, infra, these 
arguments are without merit. Plaintiffs only attempt to directly address the XanGo 
owners' unanimous opposition to Plaintiff as their class representative with respect to the 
derivative claims is to assert that such support is "irrelevant". Plaintiffs Brief at 31. 
This assertion contradicts Davis, Rothenberg, and every other case in which the 
derivative plaintiff represents shareholders other than itself, including the two cases upon 
which Plaintiff relies for the assertion, Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) 
and Brandon v. Brandon Constr. Co., Inc., 776 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1989). 
Neither Larson nor Brandon conclude that shareholder support or opposition is 
"irrelevant". The Larson court "concluded that the lack of support for the derivative suit, 
in and of itself, does not indicate that Larson is an inadequate representative." Id. 
(emphasis added). The fact that lack of support is not dispositive does not mean it is 
The Larson court was very careful to limit its findings to the facts before it: "In so 
concluding, we emphasize that cases determining when a derivative plaintiff is an 
adequate representative are fact specific, and that, in the common-law tradition, we are 
deciding only the facts before us without offering obiter dictum as to the legal 
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irrelevant, particularly when opposition is unanimous, as it is here. Indeed, the Larson 
court specifically stated that "[t]he degree of support a putative plaintiff receives from 
other shareholders . . . is a factor that should be considered in determining adequacy of 
representation. The weight given to this factor is usually left to the discretion of the trial 
court." Id, (emphasis added). In this case, the District Court acted well within its 
discretion in determining that the unanimous opposition of the other XanGo owners to 
Plaintiffs attempt to maintain claims on their behalf is highly relevant to the adequacy of 
Plaintiffs representation. 
Similarly, in Brandon, the Arkansas Supreme Court weighed shareholder support 
as a factor in determining whether the derivative plaintiff fairly and adequately 
represented similarly situated shareholders. The Brandon court gave little weight to 
shareholder opposition because, unlike this case, the derivative plaintiff was seeking to 
nullify an agreement entered into by all of the family members/shareholders of the close 
family corporation. See Brandon, 776 S.W.2d at 351. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, 
therefore, the Larson and Brandon courts do not find that shareholder opposition is 
"irrelevant". Like Davis, Rothenberg, and other cases cited above, these courts found 
that shareholder opposition is a factor to be considered in determining whether a 
derivative plaintiff fairly and adequately represents the interests of similarly situated 
shareholders. 
consequences that would attach to a different set of facts." Larson, 900 F.3d at 1369. As 
the Fifth Circuit stated in analyzing Larson, "[w]ith great difficulty, and taking care to 
limit its holding to the narrow and precise facts before it, the Ninth Circuit allowed 
Larson to proceed as a class of one." Smith v. Ayres, 911 F.3d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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Plaintiff concedes that it faces unanimous opposition from XanGo owners as their 
class representative. The District Court properly determined, based on this factor and 
others, that Plaintiff did not appear to fairly and adequately represent the interests of 
XanGo other owners. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the District Court abused its 
discretion in making this finding. The District Court's ruling should not be disturbed. 
3. Other "Outside Entanglements" and "Conflicts of Interest" 
Demonstrate That Plaintiff Does Not Appear to Fairly and 
Adequately Represent Similarly Situated XanGo Owners. 
The District Court could have, but did not (because it did not need to), based its 
decision upon other factors set forth in Davis, Rotheberg, and other cases. These factors 
include Plaintiffs non-membership in XanGo due to its refusal to sign an operating 
agreement with XanGo and the relatively small amount at issue for each non-defendant 
owner, including Plaintiff. Had the District Court weighed these factors, they also would 
have supported a finding that Plaintiff is an inadequate representative under Rule 23A(b). 
Plaintiff has not signed an operating agreement with XanGo. The District Court 
declined to rule on the issue of whether Plaintiffs refusal to sign an operating agreement 
means that Plaintiff is not a XanGo member pursuant to and, therefore, would be 
incapable of bringing derivative claims. (R. 351); see Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-703. Even 
if Plaintiff is a XanGo member, however, Plaintiffs refusal to sign an operating 
agreement with XanGo is a factor to be considered in this Court's determination of 
whether Plaintiff can fairly and adequately represent XanGo's other owners. In their 
affidavits opposing Plaintiff as their representative in this case, all but one XanGo owner 
cited the fact that Plaintiff had not signed an operating agreement with XanGo as 
37 
demonstrating Plaintiffs inadequacy as a representative. See (R. 20, 25, 30, 34-35, 40, 
45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 69-70, 74-75, 85, 90, 95, 100, 105, 110). 
Another factor to be considered is the relatively small benefit that would inure to 
Plaintiff if the derivative claims and damages were proven. The First Circuit, in G.A. 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Leisure Living Communs., Inc., 517 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1975), affirmed 
a ruling that a purported derivative plaintiff did not fairly and adequately represent a 
shareholder class when the plaintiff owned less than 1% interest in the company and only 
$2 million was at stake. See id. at 26; see also See Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 960 (finding 
that derivative plaintiff, who held only 2.04% of interest in company and was unlikely to 
receive anything from a damages award, would not fairly and adequately represent 
company's shareholders). Similar to this case, the G.A. Enterprises plaintiff owned a 
company that had brought direct claims against the company the plaintiff purported to 
represent. The G.A. Enterprises court concluded that "[e]ven if the corporation's claim 
were assumed to be worth, unrealistically, its face value, its value to a holder of less than 
1% of the company's stock would be relatively small, far less than the amounts at stake" 
in the direct action between the plaintiffs company and the company it purported to 
represent in the derivative action. Id. at 26. In the matter before this Court, Plaintiff 
owns just one percent of XanGo. (R. 66, 353). Plaintiffs counsel has asserted that $1 
million is at stake in this case. (R. 360 at 29, 34). Like the matter before the G.A. 
Enterprises court, "[i"|n these circumstances, the court could conclude that the tail might 
soon wag the dog." G.A. Enters., 517 F.2d at 26. Whatever recovery XanGo may 
receive from this derivative suit would overwhelmingly inure to the XanGo owners who 
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oppose Plaintiffs representation of XanGo's claims in this matter. Furthermore, only a 
miniscule portion of any recovery, if a recovery can be had, would inure to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff owns just a one percent interest in XanGo. The owners of the other 99% 
interest in XanGo have testified that they do not want Plaintiff to represent them with 
respect to XanGo's derivative claims. Plaintiff has sued XanGo for dissolution and 
money damages. Plaintiff has not signed an operating agreement with XanGo and may 
not be a member of XanGo. As the totality of these circumstances demonstrate, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Plaintiff does not fairly and 
adequately represent the similarly situated owners of XanGo. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DECLINED TO CONVERT DEFENDANTS5 RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION INTO A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENIED PLAINTIFF'S 
RULE 56(f) REQUEST FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY 
Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) was not subject to conversion to a motion for summary 
judgment, and the District Court properly denied Plaintiffs request for further discovery 
made pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). On at least two occasions in the 
last ten years, this Court has upheld a district court's denial of a Rule 56(f) request for 
further discovery made in response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16 ^ 20, 40 P.3d 632, 
638 (Utah 2002); Spoons v. Lewis, 987 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1999). Like the appellants in 
Wheeler and Spoons, Plaintiffs claim here, that the district court erred in denying its 
Rule 56(f) request for further discovery, "mistakenly assumes that a motion to dismiss for 
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is 
converted to a motion for summary judgment if affidavits are attached." Wheeler, ^ 16; 
Spoons, 987 P.2d at 38. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 sets forth the procedure and standards for the 
filing of motions for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) permits the filing of affidavits with 
a motion for summary judgment and Rule 56(e) provides the foundational and form 
requirements for any affidavits filed with a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(f) 
then states: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
The words "the motion" in Rule 56(f) refer to a motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) request for further discovery was made in response to Defendants' 
Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss. Because Rule 56(f) only applies when a motion for 
summary judgment has been filed, as noted by this Court in Wheeler and Spoons, 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) request for further discovery was procedurally inappropriate, and 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request.8 
Moreover, Plaintiffs request for further discovery did not demonstrate that 
Plaintiff could not "present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition" to 
the motion, as required by Rule 56(f). The non-defendant owners are not parties to this 
8
 Moreover, the facts establishing that Plaintiff did not appear to fairly and adequately 
represent similarly situated XanGo owners were uncontested, and no amount of discovery 
would change those facts. 
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derivative suit and Plaintiff had access to those owners in securing affidavits, had it 
sought access. Plaintiff did not demonstrate that it was unable to secure sworn statements 
from the non-defendant owners; it merely asserted that it needed to probe the reasons that 
the affiants testified the way that they did. It is not the purpose of Rule 56(f) to permit a 
party to engage in a speculative "fishing expedition," Aspenwood, LLC v, C.A.T., LLC, 
2003 UT App. 28, ^ 23, 73 P.3d 947, 952, particularly where that party has not even met 
the threshold requirement of standing to maintain its claims. 
In an attempt to circumvent this Court's rulings in Wheeler and Spoons, Plaintiff 
attempts to assert that its request for further discovery was something other than a request 
pursuant to Rule 56(f). See Plaintiffs Brief at 15 & n.5, is also erroneous. Plaintiff cites 
Canfieldv. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, \ 6 n.l, 122 P.3d 622, for the proposition that "[t]he 
label a party uses to name its motion is not dispositive." Plaintiffs Brief at 15 n.5. 
However, as this Court made clear in Canfield, it was willing to treat a motion labeled as 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim to dismiss as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because "the record makes clear" that the 
Court was reviewing the latter. Id. The record could not be more clear here that what 
Plaintiff wanted was for the District Court to treat Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), as a motion for summary judgment, which might trigger 
Plaintiffs ability to obtain further discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). (R. 219-221, 155-
158). Plaintiff is asking this Court to find that the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying Plaintiff relief it did not request. This Court should not begin the practice of 
granting relief to a Plaintiff that has not requested it, and should find that the District 
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Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) request for further 
discovery. 
Plaintiffs assertion that the District Court abused its discretion in denying further 
discovery is unsupported and erroneous. In support of its argument, Plaintiff cites a 
Tenth Circuit decision and an opinion by the Utah Court of Appeals. Both cases are 
inapposite. In Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App. 388, f 8, 81 P.3d 769, 
773, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that the trial court permitted the parties to file 
affidavits and granted limited discovery on the issue of venue in the context of a Rule 
12(b)(3) motion to dismiss, and determined that, upon review, it would consider "the 
complaint, affidavits, and limited record created through discovery." The Coombs court 
did not address whether the trial court would have abused its discretion had it rejected a 
request for discovery and, as such, has no bearing on the matter before this Court. 
Similarly, in Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 
2001), the Tenth Circuit, reviewing the trial court's ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss, noted that the trial court permitted limited discovery on the motion. Neither the 
Coombs court nor the Stuart courts were confronted with a claim that a trial court abused 
its discretion in denying a request for further discovery in response to a motion to 
dismiss. This Court, in both Wheeler and Spoons, were directly confronted with such an 
argument and rejected it both times. For the reasons set forth in Wheeler and Spoons, this 
Court should find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) request for further discovery. 
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Furthermore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the District Court's denial of 
Plaintiffs request for further discovery would have resulted in anything other than 
harmless error, had there been error. The discovery Plaintiff sought would not have 
addressed the issue of whether or not Plaintiff was a fair and adequate representative, nor 
would it have changed the fact that Plaintiff is simultaneously pursuing a separate lawsuit 
trying to dissolve the very company it seeks to represent. As such, Plaintiffs request for 
further discovery was properly rejected by the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Verified 
Complaint because Plaintiff "does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
[XanGo owners] similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or 
association." Similarly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Plaintiffs request for further discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the District Court's Order in all respects. 
DATED THIS 11th day of July, 2008. 
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